When Neville Chamberlain resigned in May, , the new premier, Winston Churchill kept Lord Halifax as foreign secretary in order to give the impression that the British government was united against Adolf Hitler. The following month, Joseph Goebbels recorded in his diary that Hitler had told him that peace negotiations had begun with Britain through Sweden. Three days later, a Swedish banker, Marcus Wallenberg , told British Embassy officials in Stockholm that the Germans were prepared to negotiate - but only with Lord Halifax.
In December, , Lord Halifax was replaced as foreign secretary by his long-term opponent, Anthony Eden. Halifax now became British ambassador to the United States. As Nicholas J. Cull , the author of Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American Neutrality , has pointed out: "Lord Halifax was the six-foot-six-inch, living, breathing personification of every negative stereotype that Americans nurtured with regard to Britain - the very antithesis of the dynamic new nation of Spitfires and the Dunkirk spirit.
Only two months later he learned that his youngest son, Richard, had been severely wounded. Halifax remained a somewhat reluctant ambassador over the following months. At the end of the Second World War he agreed to the request of the new Labour foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin , that he should carry on until May This extension enabled him to play an important part in the negotiations led by John Maynard Keynes to secure an American loan after the abrupt termination of lend-lease.
On his arrival home he was invited to join Churchill's shadow cabinet, but he declined the offer. However, he continued to play an active role in the House of Lords. He took part in the debate over Indian Independence. Lord Templewood, the former Samuel Hoare , criticizing the decision of the Labour cabinet to hand over India to an Indian government by June at the latest "without any provision for the protection of minorities or the discharge of their obligations".
According to David Dutton, Halifax argued that "he was not prepared to condemn what the government was doing unless he could honestly and confidently recommend a better solution, which he could not". In his retirement Lord Halifax wrote his memoirs, Fulness of Days where he attempted to defend the policy of appeasement.
The advent of Hitler to power in had coincided with a high tide of wholly irrational pacifist sentiment in Britain, which caused profound damage both at home and abroad. I had a long conversation with Lord Halifax about Germany and his recent visit. He described Hitler's appearance, his khaki shirt, black breeches and patent leather evening shoes. He told me he liked all the Nazi leaders, even Goebbels, and he was much impressed, interested and amused by the visit. He thinks the regime absolutely fantastic, perhaps even too fantastic to be taken seriously.
But he is very glad that he went, and thinks good may come of it. I was rivetted by all he said, and reluctant to let him go. Hitler invited me to begin our discussion, which I did by thanking him for giving me this opportunity. I hoped it might be the means of creating better understanding between the two countries.
The feeling of His Majesty's Government was that it ought to be within our power, if we could once come to a fairly complete appreciation of each other's position, and if we were both prepared to work together for the cause of peace, to make a large contribution to it. Although there was much in the Nazi system that profoundly offended British opinion, I was not blind to what he Hitler had done for Germany, and to the achievement from his point of view of keeping Communism out of his country.
This Government has never commanded my respect: I support it because the alternative would be infinitely worse. But our record, especially of late, is none too good. Halifax and Chamberlain are doubtless very great men, who dwarf their colleagues; they are the greatest Englishmen alive, certainly; but aside from them we have a mediocre crew; I fear that England is on the decline, and that we shall dwindle for a generation or so. On his return to England he Lord Halifax had done his best to prevent excesses in the Press; he had had discussions with two well-known cartoonists, one of them the notorious Low, and with a number of eminent representatives of the Press, and had tried to bring influence to bear on them.
Lord Halifax promised to do everything possible to prevent such insults to the Fuehrer in the future. The criticism excited by Munich never caused me the least surprise. I should very possibly indeed have been among the critics myself, if I had not happened to be in a position of responsibility.
But there were two or three considerations to which those same critics ought to have regard. One was that in criticizing the settlement of Munich, they were criticizing the wrong thing and the the wrong date. They ought to have criticized the failure of successive Governments, and of all parties, to foresee the necessity of rearming in the light of what was going on in Germany; and the right date on which criticism ought to have fastened was , which had seen the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in defiance of treaty provisions.
I have little doubt that if we had then told Hitler bluntly to go back, his power for future and larger mischief would have been broken. But, leaving entirely aside the French, there was no section of British public opinion that would not have been directly opposed to such action in To go to war with Germany for walking into their own backyard, which was how the British people saw it, at a time moreover when you were actually discussing with them the dates and conditions of their right to resume occupation, was not the sort of thing people could understand.
So that moment which, I would guess, offered the last effective chance of securing peace without war, went by. The other element that gave fuel to the fires of criticism was the unhappy phrases which Neville Chamberlain under the stress of great emotion allowed himself to use.
But when all has been said, one fact remains dominant and unchallengeable. Halifax was a man of deep sincerity and pleasing personality. In the Churchill coalition he gave the impression of being a competent statesman though not, perhaps, one destined for immortal fame.
Churchill seemed to get on well enough with him, but there was a certain coolness which suggested that he had not entirely forgotten Halifax's connexion with a cabinet which had pursued, in his judgment, wrong policies before and after war broke out.
He was one of the men of Munich. It may well be that Churchill included Halifax, as he did Chamberlain, as a deliberate policy of taking some of the prominent supporters of the Baldwin and Chamberlain regimes into his coalition to preserve the unity of his Party. As Ambassador to the U. Next to Royalty the citizens of the American republic love an aristocrat as a visitor, official or otherwise. Halifax combined his aristocratic status with a real man-to-man attitude which endeared him to the Administration, to Congressmen, to businessmen, and to the public.
The British government entered the war in September with a distinct lack of enthusiasm. For two days after the - German invasion of Poland they tried to avoid declaring war. They hoped that if the Germans would agree to withdraw, then a four-power European conference sponsored by Mussolini would be able to devise a settlement at the expense of the Poles. But Hitler remained obdurate and the British government, under immense pressure from the House of Commons, finally declared war seventy-two hours after the German attack on their ally.
But the replacement of Chamberlain by Churchill had little effect on this aspect of British policy and the collapse of France forced the government into its most serious and detailed consideration of a possible peace. Even Churchill was prepared to cede part of the Empire to Germany if a reasonable peace was on offer from Hitler. Not until July did an alternative policy - carrying on the war in the hope that the Americans would rescue Britain - become firmly established.
British peace efforts in the period remain a highly sensitive subject for British governments, even though all the participants are now dead.
Persistent diplomatic efforts to reach peace with Germany are not part of the mythology of and have been eclipsed by the belligerent rhetoric of the period. Any dent in the belief that Britain displayed an uncompromising 'bulldog spirit' throughout and never considered any possibility other than fighting on to total victory is still regarded as severely damaging to Britain's self-image and the myth of 'Their Finest Hour'.
The political memoirs of the participants either carefully avoid the subject or are deliberately misleading. Normally, government papers are available for research after thirty years but some of the most sensitive British files about these peace feelers, including key war cabinet decisions, remain closed until well into the twenty-first century. It is possible, however, to piece together what really happened from a variety of different sources and reveal the reality behind the myth.
The main contacts in the autumn of were, as in , made through the various neutral countries, which were still able to act as intermediaries between Britain and Germany.
Early in October contacts were established with the German ambassador in Ankara, von Papen, but these came to nothing. A more substantial approach was made via the Irish. On 3 October the Irish Foreign Office told the German embassy in Dublin that Chamberlain and those around him wanted peace, provided that British prestige was preserved.
This approach was not an Irish initiative but represented a British attempt to explore a possible basis for peace with Germany. The subject is still regarded as highly sensitive and all British files remain closed until Some evidence of the sort of terms the British may have had in mind is provided by Rab Butler's conversation with the Italian ambassador in London on 13 November.
Butler, obviously intending that the message should be passed on to Germany, said that the Germans would not have to withdraw from Poland before negotiations to end the war began. He also made it clear that Churchill, with his more bellicose public utterances, spoke only for himself and did not represent the views of the British government.
The possibility of peace was also high on the agenda in the spring of before the German attack on Scandinavia. Influential individuals within the British establishment thought peace should be made. When the foremost independent military expert in the country, Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, was asked in early March what he thought Britain should do, he replied: "Come to the best possible terms as soon as possible Within the government there were similar yearnings for peace.
On 24 January Halifax and his permanent secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, had a long conversation about possible peace terms. Cadogan reported that Halifax was "in a pacifist mood these days. So am I, in that I should like to make peace before war starts. If they did, then Allied terms would have to be put forward, but neither Halifax nor Cadogan could think what they should be. Cadogan concluded: "We left each other completely puzzled. This was urged by both New Zealand and Australia.
The Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, wrote to his High Commissioner in London, Bruce, that Churchill was a menace and a publicity seeker and that Britain, France, Germany and Italy should make peace before real war made the terms too stiff and then combine together against the real enemy: Bolshevism.
The meeting also considered what Britain might have to give up in order to obtain a settlement. When Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stepped down, Lord Halifax was viewed as a favorite successor, but he announced that he was not seeking the position; Winston Churchill was chosen instead, who kept Lord Halifax as his Foreign Secretary. President Franklin Roosevelt arrived in person to welcome the new British ambassador.
Instead of getting to work immediately, however, he partook fox hunting trips in Virginia in his first few weeks in the United States. Despite his initial reputation as yet another stiff and distant British aristocrat, the Americans soon realized he was an effective leader of the British propaganda machine in Washington, DC. By mid, he was running marketing campaigns around the American capital city to gather support for Britain's war effort.
In , he morned the loss of one of his children, who died in combat. Churchill's preference of keeping tight personal contact with Roosevelt meant Lord Halifax's post as ambassador was much less important, and his influence waned as the war went on.
In late , he asked to be relieved, but the request was denied. He passed away at his estate at Garrowby in Did you enjoy this article or find this article helpful? If so, please consider supporting us on Patreon. Thank you. Facebook Reddit Twitter. RSS Feeds. Show older comments. All visitor submitted comments are opinions of those making the submissions and do not reflect views of WW2DB. We hope that visitor conversations at WW2DB will be constructive and thought-provoking.
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